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Abstract—Efficient utilization of today’s high-performance
computing (HPC) systems with complex hardware and software
components requires that the HPC applications are designed
to tolerate process failures at runtime. With low mean-time-to-
failure (MTTF) of current and future HPC systems, long running
simulations on these systems require capabilities for gracefully
handling process failures by the applications themselves. In
this paper, we explore the use of fault tolerance extensions
to Message Passing Interface (MPI) called user-level failure
mitigation (ULFM) for handling process failures without the need
to discard the progress made by the application. We explore
two alternative recovery strategies, which use ULFM along with
application-driven in-memory checkpointing. In the first case, the
application is recovered with only the surviving processes, and in
the second case, spares are used to replace the failed processes,
such that the original configuration of the application is restored.
Our experimental results demonstrate that graceful degradation
is a viable alternative for recovery in environments where spares
may not be available.
Index Terms—Fault Tolerance, Process Failures, Check-
point/Restart, Message Passing Interface, Recovery
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring resilient operation is a major design hurdle for
current petascale high performance computing (HPC) systems
as well as for future exascale systems. Analyses of operational
system logs of current systems indicate a shrinking mean-time-
to-failure (MTTF), a trend that is expected to get worse in
future systems [1] with the emergence of highly complex HPC
systems that contain heterogeneous, multi-component hard-
ware and software. For most long-running HPC simulations,
the low MTTF means that the application may experience
multiple failures during their execution. Although it is possible
to design highly resilient systems based on hardware mecha-
nisms, their costs and design efforts are prohibitive. Therefore,
for many generations, HPC systems have used commodity
hardware and software components to meet stringent timelines
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and budgets. However, the successful use of these systems
in the presence of high fault rates requires software-based
mechanisms to ensure their reliable operation.
HPC applications are susceptible to both hardware and
software faults and errors, which may be transient or per-
manent in nature. Transient or soft errors are random events
caused by radiation particles affecting processing, network,
or memory elements in the system [2]. Permanent or hard
errors are caused by wear-out or device aging effects, which
manifest under specific conditions causing system components
to malfunction. From the perspective of an HPC application,
such transient and permanent errors may cause corruptions in
the application data or computations, and on occasion cause
fatal process crashes.
For a parallel HPC application using message-passing based
communication, the failure of a single process prevents for-
ward progress of the overall application. The process failure
causes the execution to cease and an abort signal to be sent to
all surviving processes. HPC applications employ checkpoint
and restart (C/R) mechanisms to recover from such failures.
C/R solutions take periodic snapshots of the global system
state, and upon a failure, the application is resumed using the
latest checkpointed state rather than starting over. However,
due to the scale of modern extreme-scale systems, global C/R
is an increasingly inefficient strategy in the presence of very
high failure rates.
The recent proposal of user-level failure mitigation (ULFM)
extensions [3] to Message Passing Interface (MPI) standard
proposes primitives to repair the communicator and to enable
the surviving processes to continue execution despite the fail-
ure of one or more MPI processes. However, ULFM does not
provide concrete failure recovery strategies, nor does it provide
the ability to recover lost application state, leaving the user to
decide which strategy to adopt for their applications. In this
paper, we explore the design of two distinct in-situ recovery
strategies in HPC applications using the MPI-ULFM interface.
In the first approach, called shrink, we isolate a failed process
and continue execution with surviving processes, and in the
second case, called substitute, we restore the original design-
time configuration of the application by use of spare processes.
In contrast to prior work [4] that focuses on performance
evaluation of the ULFM primitives, we present a detailed
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evaluation of two complete failure recovery strategies. We
evaluate our strategies for an application based on the widely
used Generalized Minimal Residual (GMRES) linear solver.
The ULFM extensions to MPI do not provide the ability
to reconstruct lost process state. While traditional check-
point/restart solutions take a global system-wide snapshot,
they tend to incur high storage, bandwidth and application
performance overheads. In this work, we also develop an
in-memory checkpointing solution to aid our ULFM-driven
shrink and substitute strategies. This approach is application-
driven, which facilitates a subset of total application state
required for forward progress of an application to be preserved.
Using point-to-point communication primitives, which are
highly optimized in HPC systems, the checkpoints are stored
in the memory of neighboring nodes in the system. This
enables rapid recovery from process failures. Additionally,
each node can assign multiple ‘buddy’ nodes that can store
its checkpoints, which supports handling multiple process
failures.
The major contributions of this work are:
• We present a detailed evaluation of process failure re-
covery strategies of substitute and shrink in the context
of parallel applications. Each of the solutions provide
the ability to mitigate process failures via reconfiguration
of the MPI communicator as well as application state
recovery capabilities.
• We use an iterative linear solver application as a use
case for demonstrating the various trade-offs and design
complexities involved in the implementation of the shrink
and substitute recovery approaches.
• We evaluate the performance overheads for in-memory
checkpoint and recovery operations at large scale in
the presence of multiple independent process failures,
which are becoming increasingly common in modern
HPC systems.
II. RELATED WORK
Prior work in supporting resilience for MPI-based applica-
tions has explored strategies by extending the MPI runtime
without changes to the interface. For example, MR-MPI [5],
rMPI [6] and their successor RedMPI [7] have introduced
redundancy at different granularities. The key benefit of these
runtime approaches is the avoidance of modifications to the
application source code to support resilience.
In contrast, ULFM requires programmer intervention, but
provides much greater flexibility in developing failure recovery
strategies and opportunities for optimization of the recovery
process. Previous works have explored the viability of various
strategies using ULFM to mitigate process failures for different
applications. For example, the Local Failure Local Recovery
(LFLR) [4] approach uses an early implementation of ULFM
MPI to facilitate recovery using spare processes. For a finite
element mini-app, which used checksums for application state
recovery, the results showed that recovery time is dominated
by the time to fix the communicator. Using a molecular
dynamics application as case study, another study evaluated
recovery by isolation of a failed MPI process by shrinking
the communicator and excluding the failed rank [8]. In a
comparison of the post-recovery performance of ULFM-driven
approaches using a synthetic benchmark [9], the performance
of collectives after shrink operations was found to deterio-
rate, since MPI implementations commonly optimize process
counts in terms of powers of two. Similarly, the work attributes
the degradation of performance after process substitution to
the distance of spare processes from failed node, which is
strongly dependent on the topology of the HPC network.
However, a detailed comparison of these strategies for the
same application on a uniform HPC platform to understand
the design trade-offs and performance overheads has not been
previously performed.
To improve the usability of ULFM, Fenix [10] provides
a wrapper interface for applications to perform application-
level in-memory checkpointing of variable state in addition
to transparent state recovery assuming spare processes are
present. A compiler-based solution was developed [11] to auto-
matically identify safe code locations where a checkpoint can
be consistently performed across all parallel processes. This
solution optimizes the performance of ULFM-based recovery.
In this work, we utilize in-memory checkpoints rather than
creating global checkpoints written using the parallel file
system. Previous work has also explored various algorithm-
based checkpoint-free schemes for application state recovery
including the use of row and column checksums on dense
matrix structures [12], the use of additional dot products to
detect errors in the matrix and vector elements of sparse
matrix computations [13], etc. While these techniques may
offer lower performance overheads, checkpoint-based recovery
is more broadly applicable to various application codes.
III. BACKGROUND: CHECKPOINT/RESTART
Checkpoint restart (C/R) is a broadly applicable technique to
mitigate process failures in distributed applications. It involves
taking checkpoints and storing them redundantly so that if a
failure were to occur, the application can recreate application
state as it was prior to the failure. Different C/R strategies
are possible depending on what aspects of the application
state are checkpointed, when the checkpoints are created and
where the checkpoints are stored. It is possible to store only
specific data structures, or even the entire system state at
the kernel-level or user-level. These two extremes represent
a trade-off in terms of memory required to store the state and
ease of implementation in terms of not needing to modify the
application source code. Maintaining checkpoints of the entire
system state across all processes can result in high storage
overheads. On the other hand, preserving a limited amount
of user-identified application state that is required for forward
progress can significantly lower the memory overheads.
When a checkpointing involves numerous processes, coor-
dinated or uncoordinated strategies are possible. Coordinated
checkpoints require that all parallel processes synchronize in
order to ensure that there are no in-flight messages, which en-
ables checkpointing of consistent global state. Uncoordinated
checkpoints are created independently by each process. This
requires message logging such that a consistent state can be
recreated across all processes upon occurrence of a failure.
However, a message sent from one process to another may be
missed during the checkpointing operation and may need to
be logged separately. Therefore, coordinated checkpoints are
often preferred in practice.
Among the key considerations of a C/R solution is the
checkpointing frequency. If checkpointing operation is per-
formed less often, the recovery from failures requires more
time due to the need for recomputation from the point of
the last stable checkpoint. When the checkpointing is per-
formed too often, there is increased overhead to the appli-
cation performance during failure-free operation. Therefore,
the trade-off between checkpoint interval and recovery la-
tency must be carefully considered. The optimal checkpoint
interval is dependent on the MTTF of the system and
checkpoint cost C. Young [14] identified the optimal check-
pointing interval assuming an exponential failure distribution
as:
√
2 ∗ C ∗MTTF
The checkpoint cost C is strongly dependent on where the
checkpoints are stored. In recent HPC systems, the parallel
file storage system was used to store the checkpoints. This
storage was assumed to be reliable, and could be used to
retrieve the checkpoints in case of a failure. However, since
this resource is shared by potentially multiple applications,
and can generate localized congestion in the network, other
alternatives have been explored. One alternative is to store
the checkpoints redundantly in the local memory and in the
memory of a buddy process. This configuration can be used
to restore lost state in case one of the processes carrying
the redundant state is alive. Optimized point-to-point message
communication can be utilized for transferring checkpoints
between buddy processes. This approach is possible with the
use of application-assisted checkpointing, which can lower
memory overheads. The performance efficiency and scalability
of this approach has been demonstrated in prior works [15].
The overhead to transfer checkpoints to buddy processes
can be eliminated by use of non-volatile memory, which is
expected to be common-place in future systems. Multilevel
checkpointing is also possible, where redundant checkpoints
are maintained across multiple memory layers and checkpoint
intervals for each layer are adjusted based on the cost of
performing checkpoint at that layer [16].
Therefore, the key factors in the design and implementation
of a C/R solution are the scope of the state captured during the
checkpoint operation, the frequency and the storage location
for the checkpoint. The primary overheads involved are the
time to perform checkpoints and extent of recomputation
during recovery, which are referred to as the waste overhead
of a C/R implementation. The main goal is to reduce this
overhead. Other overheads associated with process failure
tolerance include: overhead of detecting process failures, time
to reconfigure and recover parallel runtime environment after a
failure and the time to recover application state. The discussion
of these factors is provided in the next sections.
IV. DETECTION, RECONFIGURATION AND IN-SITU
RECOVERY FOR MITIGATION OF PROCESS FAILURES
HPC applications rely on a distributed runtime system
software for detection of process failures. We utilize the
fault tolerant version of MPI communication library ULFM
for reliable notification of process failures. The ULFM im-
plementation extends the MPI operations with capabilities
to notify the application of anomalies in the group of pro-
cesses involved in a communication operation, i.e., a process
failure is notified when a MPI operation can not be com-
pleted as intended. The fault detection capabilities of ULFM
need to be initialized by changing the default error handler
MPI_ERRORS_ARE_FATAL on the communication objects.
During the execution of a MPI routine, if an error occurs, a
notification is raised to the processes involved in a communica-
tion operation via the return code MPI_ERR_PROC_FAILED.
Consensus-based algorithm among neighbors and timeouts are
commonly used to detect failed processes. These detection
mechanisms incur some overhead in comparison to the stan-
dard MPI implementations that do not provide these features.
However, recent efforts show considerable decrease in these
overheads and scalable operation [17].
From an application’s perspective, the error reporting capa-
bility of ULFM provides the ability to take either a proactive
or a reactive approach to failure detection. If an applica-
tion requires timely notification of failure to all processes,
then a proactive approach may involve strategic placement
of collective operations inside the code, such that a failure
is detected early on and costly re-computation is avoided.
However, frequent calls to collective routines introduce high
synchronization overheads. Therefore, another approach is to
wait for error notification by a MPI operation in the code,
i.e., a reactive approach. This can involve checking the error
codes of every MPI call, or at least a selected subset of calls.
This may also be easily accomplished by implementing a MPI
error handler that is called every time an error is notified by
one of the MPI routines. Error propagation to other processes
and recovery is orchestrated by this error handler. Once each
surviving process has been notified of the failure in the parallel
computing environment, then reconfiguration and recovery
needs to be performed in a manner which is most beneficial
to the HPC application. To begin with, we utilize ULFMs
capability to remove all failed processes from communication
objects (by using MPI_COMM_SHRINK()). The generated
pristine MPI objects are used in future communications among
parallel processes. Afterwards, it is left on to the user to
recover application state and to resume forward progress of
the application towards the final solution. In doing so, we have
two options, either resume with same number of processes as
the application began with, a strategy referred to as substitute,
or resume with reduced number of processes, a strategy
referred to as shrink. We explore the implications of both these
options on application assisted in-memory checkpointing in
this section. Both have different design tradeoffs, and their
impact on application performance will be evaluated in the
Fig. 1. Substitute approach: recovery mechanism for both static and dynamic
distributed objects. The spares are represented by φ.
experiment and results section.
A. Substitute: Supplemental Computation with Spares
The substitute approach requires allocation of spare pro-
cesses which can take the form of warm or cold spares,
depending on whether the processes are allocated at design
time or spawned at runtime. In this work, we do not con-
sider hot spares since those entail redundant computation for
each and every process, e.g., modular redundancy-MPI [5].
MR-MPI employs complete state replication across spares
and therefore does not require checkpointing of application
state. This can be extremely resource intensive yet sudden
degradation in reliability is incurred once failures start to
happen since failed processes are not replaced and subsequent
failures in non redundant processes can be fatal. Therefore, we
resort to spares which can be integrated into the application
as the need arises, i.e., as failures occur. The spares which
are design time allocated are warm spares, and processes
spawned at runtime are referred to as cold spares. Use of
both approaches is appropriate and similar from the context
of the application, but spawning processes at runtime has
more overhead. In addition, some computing environments
restrict spawning of new processes by an already scheduled
job. We therefore discuss the use of warm spares for restoring
the original configuration of the application, as a substitute
strategy. One obvious disadvantage in this case is the non-
utilization of resources in the failure free case.
The availability of spare processes provides the opportunity
for processes to continue execution with workload similar to
that of a failure-free setup. This is extremely useful for applica-
tions which perform initial compute-intensive data distribution
based on the input. For example, balancing the number of non-
zero elements assigned to each process in a sparse input matrix
requires the use of graph processing algorithms. Additionally,
the use of spare strategy is mandatory in some applications due
to constraints on problem decomposition, e.g., cube number
of processes are required if the problem is being decomposed
onto a cubic mesh.
On the implementation side, programming effort is required
to integrate the spare processes into the application code.
The effort involved is highly dependent on the programming
language used and the structure of the code if an existing code
base needs to be made resilient. The allocated warm spares
need to be segregated at the beginning of the computation, and
Fig. 2. Checkpointing operation in case of substitute approach after utilization
of a spare process.
wait for their utilization during failure recovery. Once pristine
communicator objects have been attained, the spare process
can be stitched in. In the new configuration, the spare process
is assigned a rank/id (the ranks for processes are represented
by unique numbers) similar to that of the failed process as
shown in Figure 1.
After we fix the parallel runtime environment and its ob-
jects, the application state of the spare process needs to be
populated. We use the checkpoints taken prior to a failure to
construct the application state for the spare process. The spare
process communicates with the neighbor of the failed process
for this purpose since it maintains a copy of application state
for the failed process as shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the
portion of application state for each process is represented by
letters A, B, etc., and the backup data-structure illustrates how
a redundant copy is maintained at the neighboring process.
During recovery, the survivors use their local copy to restore
the application state while the spare process uses MPI point-
to-point communication to get its portion of the application
state from the backup data-structure. Along with the recovery
of distributed state space, there is also a need to synchronize
the state of the processes which is local to them. This is
supposed to be consistent across processes, and we can use
any surviving process to populate the local state of the spare
process. For example, the number of iterations across all
processes should be same, otherwise, the spare process may
diverge and possibly cause a deadlock. Thus, this is a crucial
step in the application state recovery process.
The application can resume after consistent recovery of
application state across all processes. The point of restart
needs to be coordinated among all processes. For example,
exception handling blocks can be used to jump to the start
of an iterative block after recovering from a process failure.
To sustain future failures, the application continues to make
checkpoints of dynamic state across the set of processes
involved in the computation as shown in Figure 2. There is no
change in the size of checkpoints taken across these processes
as compared to failure free case. However, since spares may
be placed on a physically distant node, assuming the mapping
is not changed during the computation. An increase in latency
can be observed during ordinary communication operations
as well as during the checkpoint operation. For instance, a
neighboring process based on rank may not be a physical
Fig. 3. Shrink approach: checkpoint and recovery mechanism for static and
dynamic distributed objects.
neighbor after the spare processes have been utilized. This
can give rise to arbitrary communication patterns instead of
regular communication patterns which may be present in
the application by design. This effects performance during
message communications depending on the layout of the HPC
network.
B. Shrink: Graceful Degradation with Survivors
The shrink strategy for process failure recovery alleviates
the need to have spare processes allocated at design time.
However, determining the right number of spare processes can
be challenging and may depend on multiple factors, such as the
number of failures expected (based on MTTF of the system)
and the number of available resources. On the other hand,
arbitrary number of process failures can be sustained using
the shrink approach, as long as there are enough surviving
processes to continue execution of the application without
significant performance impact. In this approach, all processes
get to perform useful work from the start. However, good
performance or throughput is strongly dependent on whether
the application can dynamically adjust the workload across all
the surviving processes. Non uniform workload distribution
can affect performance significantly since some processes
may end up doing bulk of the work and overall application
performance is determined by the slowest process.
The recovery of application from process failures in this
case involves effort from the user. This is because domain
knowledge is required in most cases to re-distribute workload
among surviving processes. To illustrate, let us take the simple
example of distributing a vector with R rows among P parallel
processes. Assuming perfect divisibility, each process gets RP
rows in a block wise manner in the beginning. After the failure
of one process, we need to redistribute the R rows among P−1
processes. For uniform workload distribution, each surviving
process needs to be assigned at least R(P−1) − RP extra rows.
This is accomplished via inter-process communication among
neighboring processes. The cycle is repeated every time a
failure occurs and the workload on each survivor keeps on
increasing as more failures are encountered.
The above re-distribution can take place during state recov-
ery while using the checkpointed dynamic and static state of
the application as shown in Figure 3. In-memory checkpoints
with redundant data across local and remote processes ensures
that every process get its desired chunk of the assigned data.
In some cases, it is possible to exclusively use local data
to reconstruct desired state. For the example illustrated in
Figure 3 whereby process with rank 4 (process id) has failed.
All processes with rank less than 4 need to communicate
with their neighbors to get a chunk of their local data. For
instance, the process with rank 3 needs to communicate with
process having rank 5 to grab a chunk of its backup data.
Whereas, the processes with ranks greater than the rank of
the failed process can use their local data alone to conform to
the new data distribution pattern. Consequently, the amount of
communication during state recovery depends on the location
of the failed process, i.e., failure of processes with higher ranks
results in more messages on the network.
After the re-distribution and recovery of application state,
we need to update all the in-memory checkpoints. This helps
to ensure that future failures are sustained and every distributed
data chunk has a backup. This adds on to the cost of state re-
covery. Any future checkpoints of dynamic state must comply
with the new distribution plan.
We do not need to recover local variables in case of
shrink strategy and the application can resume execution after
the above steps. With this approach, the number of workers
decrease over time and checkpoint overhead per process
increases over time. It is imperative to consider all these
overheads while choosing a recovery strategy.
V. USE CASE: ITERATIVE SOLVER
Iterative methods for solving linear equations assume re-
liability of data and arithmetic operations. If faults occur
during execution, they cause the solver to either abort or to
compute an incorrect result with no warning. To support fault
resilience, application-level solutions often rely on algorithm-
level techniques that encode computations using linear error
correcting codes, or leverage the mathematical convergence
properties of the solver to ensure it produces a correct outcome
at the cost of needing additional iterations.
A fault tolerant version of the Generalized Minimal Residual
(GMRES) called FT-GMRES [18] uses the notion of selective
reliability to ensure that the solver converges to a correct
outcome. The original GMRES method was developed as a
Krylov subspace method for an iterative solution of large
sparse nonsymmetric linear systems of the form Ax = b
[19]. The method was improved by partitioning the solver
into inner-outer iterations, where the “inner” solve step pre-
conditions the “outer” flexible iteration [20]. The FT-GMRES
algorithm requires that only the outer iterations are highly
reliable, while any faults during the execution of the inner
iterations are tolerated. This partitioning of the solver, which
executes only a fraction of the solver’s computations in highly-
reliable mode, offers protection against possibly unbounded
numerical errors caused by silent data corruptions.
However, MPI-based applications that use the FT-GMRES
method are not protected against hard errors that may cause
one or more of the MPI ranks to fail. Such process failures
caused by hardware component malfunctions or compute node
failures are unavoidable in large-scale HPC platforms.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Implementation details: In this work, we have utilized
the FT-GMRES solver from [21], which is implemented
using C++ based Tpetra package within the Trilinos 12.6.4
framework [22]. The Tpetra package provides the ability to
distribute large objects such as sparse matrices, dense vectors
onto multiple parallel processes using a variety of parallel
programming models. It allows FT-GMRES to do parallel
operations such as sparse matrix vector multiplication, vector
scalar multiplication, etc. Using this setup, FT-GMRES is able
to solve large-scale linear systems.
Our contributions to FT-GMRES include: 1) altering the
application to support MPI-ULFM instead of standard MPI,
2) adding process failure detection and reconfiguration mecha-
nisms, 3) adding support for in-memory checkpoints to recover
application state, 4) adding dynamic workload redistribution
in case of shrink strategy, and 5) adding warm spares to be
utilized for recovery in case of substitute strategy.
In this work, we have utilized the ULFM version 1.1 which
uses Open MPI version 1.7.1 as a base implementation. All
necessary changes are made to the code for integration of
MPI-ULFM and to leverage its capability to resume appli-
cation despite process failures. Specifically, ULFM is able
to detect process failures reliably, identify the identity of
the failed processes, notify survivors about process failures,
and reconstruct the communication objects. Process failures
are detected proactively by a custom MPI error handler, i.e.,
control is transferred to the error handler whenever an error
code is returned by any MPI call. After recovery is complete,
we leverage C++ exception handling to coordinate a uniform
restart location across all processes, i.e., we jump to beginning
of the iterative block.
Our implementation provides the ability to checkpoint Tpe-
tra objects of sparse matrix and dense vectors. These objects
are checkpointed in the memory of buddy nodes according to
user-defined mapping and checkpoint intervals. For instance,
dynamic objects such as the solution vector which changes at
every iteration of the solver is checkpointed according to user
defined interval, whereas, static objects such as matrix A and
right hand side vector b only need to be checkpointed upon a
process failure.
Evaluation platform: We use a 960-core Linux cluster
with a fully connected dual-bonded 1 Gbps Ethernet for
our experiments. Each compute node has 2 AMD Opteron
processors each (with 12 cores each) and 64 GB memory. The
interconnect supports non-blocking point-to-point bandwidth
of 215 MB/s. We use process counts of 32, 64, 128, 256, and
512 in our experiments. The mapping of processes onto cores
is designed to incorporate the effect of communication over
the network.
Test problem: A test problem is generated by discretizing
a regular 3D mesh in Trilinos framework. We solve a linear
system with sparse matrix A having about 7 million rows and
186 million nonzero elements. We fix the problem size for all
experiments. Thus, the number of elements assigned to each
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison between the shrink and substitute recovery
strategies with up to four process failure injections.
process decreases as we increase the scale of our experiments.
In failure free setup with above problem configuration, the
solver converges to a solution within 325 iterations total.
Process failure injection: We perform controlled process
failure injections in our experiments to produce reproducible
results as follows: (1) The rank positions of failed processes
are fixed throughout the experiments. These positions are
selected to represent worst case scenarios for shrink and
substitute approaches. In case of substitute recovery exper-
iments, the failed process is selected to be on a different
physical node from the node on which the spare processes
reside. By default, the spare processes are mapped to the later
nodes in the experiment. This ensures network communication
delays are added when spares are utilized by the application.
Whereas, process failures are injected towards higher ranks
when shrinking recovery strategy is used, as it represents the
worst case in network communication during state recovery
phase as described earlier (see Figure 3); (2) The failure
injection time window is fixed for each injection experiment.
Note, we checkpoint dynamic state only after the completion
of one inner solve operation (every 25 iterations of the solver),
thus there is an upper bound on the amount of re-computation.
During our experiments, we inject up to four independent
process failures to simulate the effects on long running HPC
simulations. We therefore evaluate the sustainability of both
recovery approaches. It helps us to understand how the re-
covery characteristics or overheads change from one failure
to another. It also provides us the opportunity to model these
overheads in terms of a single process failure overhead, which
is useful since it alleviates the need to run extra experiments.
In each case, a process failure injection is simulated by
a system call to SIGKILL. Furthermore, we assume the
presence of adequate number of spares when utilizing the
substitute recovery strategy.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, a detailed performance comparison of shrink
and substitute approaches for in-situ recovery to process fail-
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Fig. 5. Checkpoint times normalized to the no failure case.
ures is done for the FT-GMRES solver. Figure 4 demonstrates
the performance slowdowns or reduction in time-to-solution
with each recovery approach sustaining multiple independent
process failures in comparison to the no protection case.
Each point in this plot is obtained by averaging results from
multiple experiments such that standard deviations are low,
i.e., the coefficient of variation range between 0.01 and 0.15.
Most of the variation in results is due to the recomputation
overheads since the position and window of failure injection
is fixed in all experiments, as discussed earlier. The bars
with patterns in Figure 4 represent the performance of shrink
strategy and solid bars represent the performance of substitute
strategy. The values close to one (no protection) translate to
a lower overhead. For instance, the ‘0 Fail’ case shows the
cost of providing process failure tolerance in case of failure
free conditions. Results demonstrate that the overheads to
perform the checkpoint decreases with scale since the number
of elements to checkpoint per process decreases.
A significant slowdown is observed in case of both shrink
and substitute approaches when mitigating process failures.
The overhead increases with increasing number of process fail-
ures since the state recovery overheads are additive. Recall that
the performance overheads when tolerating process failures in-
clude the checkpointing overheads, reconfiguration overheads,
state recovery overheads, and re-computation overheads. The
use of spare processes provides a performance advantage as
compared to the shrink strategy at process counts greater than
32 for all injection campaigns. However, this advantage starts
to diminish with increase in scale since there is not a substan-
tial increase in workload at each process when using the shrink
approach. A more thorough analysis of the overheads in each
case reveals that the checkpoint overheads tend to be higher
for the substitute recovery strategy as shown in Figure 5,
especially at lower process counts. Results demonstrate that
the checkpoint overheads do not increase multiplicatively with
increasing failures for the substitute recovery approach. We
attribute this behaviour to the placement of spares as discussed
later on. On the contrary, a linear pattern is observed in case
of shrink recovery approach.
Figure 5 also shows the comparison of checkpoint overheads
with respect to the total time to solution between shrink and
substitute approaches with four process failures plotted on
the secondary y-axis. It can be observed that the checkpoint
overhead for substitute approach is high as compared to the
shrink approach at processor counts of 32, 64 and 128, and is
comparable at processor counts of 256 and 512. The overhead
is as high as 28% at a processor count of 32 and tends
to decrease to as low as 5% at a processor count of 512.
At large scales, the checkpoint overheads are similar for
both approaches due to smaller inter-process communication
overheads. On the other hand, the observed difference in
overheads at small scale is due to placement of spares in the
system. Since we use fixed mapping throughout the computa-
tion as provided in the standard implementation of MPI, the
communication with utilized spare processes tend to add to the
overheads. The spare processes are always mapped towards
the later nodes (highest ranks are assigned to the spares). To
aggravate this issue, the process failures in our experiments are
forced to be on a different node as compared to the location
of the spares. Therefore, when the spare processes replace
the failed processes, it can lead to higher communication
overheads as discussed earlier (see Figure 2). This overhead
is increased when we use more spare processes, i.e., more
failures are mitigated. We expect this overhead to be present
in other parallel operations as well.
A comparison of recovery overheads between shrink and
substitute approaches is shown in Figure 6 (the overheads w.r.t.
total time to solution are plotted on the secondary y-axis).
For most cases, the recovery overheads tend to be comparable
and range from 19.5% to as low as 1.5%. Note, there is
a drop from 19.5% to 9% going from 32 to 64 processes.
Figure 6 also shows that it is relatively straightforward to
estimate the overheads for multiple failures from the recovery
costs of a single failure. Almost similar recovery overheads in
both cases show that most of the overhead is due to inter-
process communication required to reconstruct application
state. Therefore, the workload re-distribution overheads in case
of shrink approach tend to be negligible. Our results also
indicate that the reconfiguration overheads are negligible, i.e.,
they range from 0.01% to 0.05%. Although, a slight increase
in overhead is observed in our experiments when the spare
process needs to be stitched into the repaired communicator
object. Overall, both recovery and reconfiguration overheads
tend to be lower as compared to the checkpoint overheads.
Discussion: Our experimental results show that the shrink
approach provides graceful performance degradation at large
scale when enough workers are present to share the workload
of the failed processes. This is based on the assumption that
workload redistribution is supported in the application which
is observed to have negligible overhead in our experiments.
Our results also show that the mapping of spare processes
can significantly affect application performance especially at
smaller scales since it disrupts regular communication pattern
of the application. This can mitigate the performance benefit of
having spares when communication overheads in the applica-
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tion are dominant. Finally, the results presented are widely ap-
plicable for large-scale high-end scientific applications which
support parallelism by distributing matrices and vectors among
processes. The Tpetra package, which has been modified for
this work is widely used in the HPC scientific community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In extreme-scale HPC systems, various types of malfunc-
tions and component failures occur at very high frequencies.
For parallel HPC applications developed using MPI, these
events are often fatal since the failure of even a single process
causes the remaining processes in the MPI communicator to
block indefinitely, preventing forward progress of the HPC
application. While recent ULFM extensions to MPI provide
simple primitives to support MPI communicator recovery,
they don’t explicitly support the recovery of lost application
state, nor do they provide well-defined application recovery
models. In this paper, we explored two alternative strategies
for handling process failure recovery of MPI applications. We
evaluated how the different implementations use application-
driven process recovery with in-memory checkpointing to offer
different levels of performance and scalability. We demon-
strated how these strategies may be flexibly applied on an
application-specific basis to gracefully handle failures while
minimizing any degradation in the application performance.
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